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Dunlap and Lyon: Effectiveness of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act:

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND
RECLAMATION ACT: RECLAMATION OR REGULATORY
SUBVERSION?
LOUISE C. DUNLAP*
JAMES S. LYoN**
I.

INTRODUCTION

August 3, 1985 marked the eighth anniversary of the passage by Congress of
the landmark Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA or the Act).
In 1977 it was unprecedented legislation in many substantive areas. SMCRA blazed
the trail in providing the public with broad sweeping rights to participate in the
regulatory process, national minimum environmental protection standards and mining performance regulations, mandatory penalties for gross strip mining abuse, and
an industry funded program to reclaim past abandoned and unreclaimed mine sites.
The citizens across the nation battled uphill for seven years to get this legislation
passed by Congress. Major hurdles, including two presidential vetoes, were overcome. SMCRA is a strong but necessary response to decades of reckless and irresponsible strip mining abuse that plagued coalfield communities, destroyed personal property, ruined (permanently in all too many cases) millions of acres of
land, and polluted thousands of fresh water streams, as well as underground water
supplies.
Despite dire predictions by the coal industry, SMCRA has not contributed to
a downfall in coal production. In fact, since SMCRA was enacted, annual coal
production has soared from 691 million tons in 1977 to approximately 830 million
today.' While the coal market has been soft in the 1980s, that has not been a result
of SMCRA's implementation but rather due to external factors such as falling oil
prices, energy conservation, increased foreign coal development, and coal transportation costs.
Almost immediately after implementation of SMCRA had begun, the face of
surface coal mining changed dramatically in the coalfields. No longer was the regular
operator practice of dumping topsoil and mining spoil over the downslope permitted by law. No longer was it permissible to blast flyrock through community homes
while regulators looked the other way. No longer was it permitted to allow the
water runoff from a mine to cause erosion, stream sedimentation, or acid drainage
without severe penalties. Prime farmland soils were now required to be protected
and preserved prior to coal extraction so that post-mining productivity could be
ensured. Alluvial valley floors that are so critical to hydrology of western lands
were now prohibited from being mined. While initial compliance failures by mining operators hindered progress, SMCRA almost immediately curbed much of the
systemic mining abuse that plagued the nation.
*
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The controversy over strip mining regulations, however, was not put to rest
in 1977. It continues today. Many coal companies and many states have strongly
resisted the new requirements of SMCRA. Particularly since the Reagan Administration came to power in 1981, the Office of Surface Mining (OSM), the federal
regulatory agency charged with SMCRA's implementation and enforcement, has
been subjected to enormous pressures from the coal industry, the states, and within
the Department of Interior to weaken the effectiveness of SMCRA. In answer to
these assaults, environmental and citizen organizations responded, with the help
of several key members of Congress, by calling for congressional oversight hearings and independent investigations into OSM's roll-back policies. 2 More importantly, the citizens' coalition has aggressively challenged many of these policy changes
in the courts. 3 At every turn, special studies, congressional reports, and numerous
court decisions have been scathingly critical of OSM's roll-back policies and have
supported strong enforcement and stringent interpretation of the law.
Nevertheless, the persistent efforts to undermine the effectiveness of SMCRA
have taken a terrible toll on OSM and the ability of its staff to meet its responsibilities under the law. In 1985, by almost everyone's account in the surface mining arena, including the Department of Interior,' OSM is in complete disarray.
It is confused about its purpose. It lacks stable management and sound policy direction. Its staff is totally demoralized, and it is regularly victim to chronic bureaucratic
bungling.
In light of OSM's failures to meet its responsibilities and adequately enforce
the law, some are now beginning to question the effectiveness of the Act itself.
It is the purpose of this paper to explore some of these questions, as well as to
expose certain false assumptions regarding the intent of SMCRA that are presently
being aired.
II.

Is THE ACT WORKING?

The question raised most frequently concerns the effectiveness of the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act. Is the Act really working? Is it changing
how surface mining and reclamation occur? Is SMCRA meeting its congressional
intent? There is no single answer to these questions.
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act is very complex and
multifaceted in character. The law regulates surface mining activities on private,
2

See H.R. REP. No. 206, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1985); H.R. REP. No. 1146, 98th Cong.,

2d Sess. 42 (1984);

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, MANAGEMENT REVIEW OF THE OFFICE OF SURFACE

MINING (June 1985).

' In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation 11, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1193
(D.D.C. July 6, 1984); 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1724 (D.D.C. October 1, 1984); 22 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1557 (D.D.C. March 12, 1985); 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2153 (D.D.C. July 15, 1985) (Appeal
Pending) [hereinafter In re Surface Mining IIl.
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state, federal, and Indian lands in over twenty-six coal states. Most states have
chosen to be the primary regulatory authority (primacy). SMCRA regulates
thousands and thousands of coal mining operators who run the gamut from small
independent operators to mid-size companies to large multinational energy conglomerates. It regulates the surface effects from both underground and surface mining, and it applies to all types of coal (bituminous, anthracite, and lignite) and
mining terrain from Appalachian steep slopes to midwestern prime farmland to
western arid lands. The Act also protects millions of people who live in the coalfields
from the adverse effects of mining, as well as millions of people who live outside
of the coal regions but who are impacted by longer term factors such as flooding
and water quality. SMCRA's environmental protection provisions also address such
diverse issues as blasting practices, revegetation, dust control, water quality and
quantity, slope reconstruction and stability, topsoil and farmland protection, national park and forest protection, cemetery protection, and appropriate post-mining
land use.
In reexamining the sweeping scope of SMCRA, it is obvious that it is extremely
difficult to present a blanket statement as to the effectiveness of this law. Its varied
requirements all have been implemented with both successes and failures since 1977.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, it is necessary to examine key provisions of the law and compare them
with congressional intent when the law was passed.
Aside from the sheer complexity of the Act, another difficulty in evaluating
its effectiveness is that not enough time has yet passed for a fair assessment. Due
to the continuing major conflicts over the Act, implementation and enforcement
of the law has been in a constant state of flux since its inception over eight years
ago. Thus, it is probably still premature to offer a fair assessment of the effectiveness of the Act's principles in practice.
Where and why did this conflict originate? Congress passed the Act in 1977
in response to a crisis in the coalfields. There was undisputed evidence of widespread systemic mining abuse across the nation. Equally obvious at the time was
the fact that the states, with a few notable exceptions, had failed miserably to regulate
mining within their borders.' Congress sought to resolve the massive problem through
the concept of national minimum performance standards. OSM was created in 1978
and charged with the responsibility of implementing and enforcing SMCRA. Since
SMCRA's concepts were new, the enormity of OSM's task should not be overlooked. The Department of Interior, under the leadership of Secretary Cecil Andrus, moved vigorously to implement OSM's regulatory program. Interior's assertiveness was attributable in part to the Secretary's strong support for the Act's
passage and his commitment to implementing the fullest intent of the law.

I H.R.

REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 182 (1977).
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At the same time, the environmental citizen community had many differences
with the Andrus Administration's initial attempts to assemble the program. But
specific policy differences aside, the public was confident that the Department of
Interior was engaged in a good-faith effort to implement the intent of the
law,
Immediately upon final promulgation, OSM's federal surface mining regulations were challenged in the courts by the coal industry. A coalition of environmental
and citizen organizations intervened in opposition." The industry challenge was rejected by the courts, thus upholding OSM's first regulations. Also during the late
1970s, several states filed suit challenging the constitutionality of SMCRA. The
Supreme Court later ruled on this challenge in 1981 by unanimously upholding
7
the Act's constitutionality.
Conflict came early to OSM, but fortunately it did not hinder the progress
toward full implementation of this new law. In fact, these early challenges may
have actually strengthened OSM since both the Act and its regulatory program
were tested and affirmed by the courts. This progress, however, was brought to
a grinding halt with the election of President Reagan in 1980. Interior Secretary
James Watt immediately singled out OSM as an example of regulatory zealotry.
Using a Heritage Foundation report8 as a blueprint for action, Mr. Watt sought
to undermine the Act by revising the federal regulations and reorganizing the agency
to drive out its career staff and weaken OSM's ability to meet its responsibilities.
First came the Secretary's reorganization of OSM.9 Disguised as "management
realignment," it ruthlessly forced over fifty percent of OSM's experienced personnel to leave the agency through firings, undesirable field transfers, and sheer intimidation.' 0 This misguided undertaking probably did more to permanently cripple the agency's effectiveness than any other action. Even today, this "brain drain"
has left OSM understaffed, inexperienced, disorganized, and demoralized.
At the same time, Secretary Watt ordered OSM to rewrite over ninety percent
of the federal regulations that had just been tested and upheld in court. Under
the excuse of regulatory reform, the changes in the regulations substantially weakened
many environmental'protection provisions and reduced opportunities for public participation. In response to Secretary Watt's gutting of the regulations, the Environmental Policy Institute (EPI) and eight other environmental and citizen
organizations filed a massive lawsuit against Secretary Watt.'" The court has now
6

In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation I, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1089 (D.D.C.

1980).
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
R.C. TERRILL & D.C. RUSSELL, MANDATE FOR LEADERSHIP (The Heritage Foundation 1980)
(Project Team Report for the Dep't of the Interior).

' See DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

PROPOSAL TO REORGANIZE THE OFFICE OF SURFACE MININO

(April 1981); Letter from Representative Patricia Schroeder, Chairwoman of the House Subcommittee
on Civil Service, to James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior (October 28, 1982).
"

In re Surface Mining II, supra note 3.
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ruled in all three rounds of decisions overwhelmingly in favor of the citizens. Virtually every major change sought by the Watt Administration has been rejected.
Accordingly, the agency must now propose yet a new set of regulations to take
the place of those rejected by the court. As a result of this reckless effort by Secretary
Watt, OSM's regulatory program has no more stability or finality than it did immediately after OSM's creation in 1978.
OSM also lost several major court cases filed by citizen organizations regarding OSM's failure to enforce the law in key areas. Particularly noteworthy is the
"megabucks" lawsuit" which challenged OSM's failure to collect tens of millions
of dollars in civil penalties and its laxity in forcing mine operators to remedy the
scores of serious environmental violations.
Due to this disruptive history, it will now take a minimum of several years
under stable OSM management, coupled with vigorous enforcement of an unfluctuating regulatory program, to be able to make a meaningful judgment as to the
effectiveness of SMCRA's principles in actual practice. In the meantime, however,
it is possible to judge the current status of some key provisions of the law in light
of Congress' intent in passing SMCRA.
III.

STATE PRIMACY AND OSM OVERSIGHT

Central to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act is the concept
of state primacy. Under the law, states have an opportunity to be the primary
regulatory authority for mining within their borders if they develop, implement,
and enforce a regulatory program which meets the requirements of the federal law.
OSM has the responsibility under the law to use enforcement oversight to ensure
that the states are meeting these standards. When the states fail, OSM is explicitly
required to directly enforce the law.
The concept of primacy was a political compromise accepted by citizen organizations to obtain passage of SMCRA. In proposing surface mining legislation in the
1970s, EPI promoted a general federal regulatory approach. The political climate
at that time, however, was not conducive to a solely federal regulatory program
in the coalfields. Recognizing this reality, EPI and the citizen coalition opted for
the greater goal of achieving national minimum standards by accepting the compromise of state primacy. At the time it was not an unpalatable decision for citizen
groups because the threads of ultimate federal authority are woven throughout the
fabric of the primacy concept. In EPI's opinion, implementation and enforcement
of the national standards was the greater goal. We believed that if the states would
regulate mining within their borders according to federal standards, that would
meet our goal. If, however, the states failed to enforce these standards, EPI saw

Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Watt, 558 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 725
F,2d 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (opinion vacated April 23, 1984); Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc.
v. Clark, 725 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (opinion vacated April 23, 1984).
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that ultimate federal enforcement responsibility would be the insurance for meeting
that goal.
Privately EPI acknowledged that a purely federal program would have cost
much less than a state primacy-federal oversight program and would have been
much less complicated to implement. However, faced with the political reality of
accepting the primacy concept over no federal statute at all, and supported by the
assurance that ultimate federal responsibility would be exercised in cases of state
breakdowns, EPI accepted primacy and continues to support it today. As long as
ultimate federal authority is an integral part of SMCRA, EPI still believes that
the stated goals of SMCRA can be met through state primacy.
The Watt'Administration distorted the concept of primacy by promoting a
"states rights" approach. This approach was evident under Watt in the quality
of state programs that OSM approved, the reduced level of meaningful citizen participation OSM allowed in the formation of state regulatory programs, and in the
cooperative agreements OSM negotiated with the states regarding mining regulations on federal lands. These approved programs and agreements fostered the attitude that SMCRA was a state regulatory approach with diminished federal authority rather than the federally-oriented program intended by Congress in 1977.
This "states rights" approach was even further promoted by Secretary Watt
to reduce OSM's enforcement presence in the coal fields. The OSM reorganization
of 1981 greatly reduced the number of federal inspectors in the field from over
220 to only 69.1' Through other policy directives, the total number of mining violations cited by OSM inspectors in 1981 also plummeted. The quality and quantity
of oversight data collected by OSM to evaluate state compliance with SMCRA was
significantly reduced. This data collection problem was in part due to OSM's crippled
state of management after the reorganization, but it was also due to calculated
efforts by Watt to reduce OSM's federal oversight and provide the state with carte
blanche, knowing full well that many states would yield to industry pressure and
reduce the vigor of their regulatory programs.
In sum, Watt sent a very strong signal to the states starting in 1981. His message
was that the federal government was no longer going to be diligent in its oversight
responsibilities and that the states were for the most part free to implement and
enforce the law as they saw fit. Secretary Watt called this his "good neighbor"
policy with the states. Citizens saw it as a repudiation of congressional policy in
favor of state primacy and a return to the pre-SMCRA pattern of state exclusion
of citizens and knuckling under to industry pressure for lax enforcement.
Prior to 1977, most states had a dismal record of surface mining regulation.
This was attributable to several things. State mining agencies have always had a
difficult time insulating themselves from the political and economic pressures of
" DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, PROPOSAL TO REORGANIZE THE OFFICE OF SURFACE MININ o

1981).
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the coal industry. Coal mining is not only essential to the economy of many coal
states, but, in many cases, it is the only major industry in a region. Without economic
diversity to balance the interests of coal development with the need for regulation,
state mining regulation has usually been compromised. The coal industry has shown
itself to be very capable of influencing state legislatures, governors' offices, local
governments, and even state courts.' 3 Often, its influence is quite direct. Key positions in the legislature and state governments are regularly filled by former coal
industry representatives and supporters. With this political reality, it is easy to see
why many state regulatory efforts failed so miserably prior to the passage of
SMCRA.
Because of the states' inability to insulate themselves from such influence, EPI
initially proposed a single federal regulatory program for SMCRA. As earlier discussed, state primacy was the compromise in the final version. The Watt Administration then turned primacy into an excuse for virtually eliminating federal involvement. As a result, state compliance with SMCRA again started sliding to the lowest
common denominator. This trend could be seen by examining OSM's own data.'
Despite EPI's criticism of the lack of quality of data that OSM collected, certain
glaring problems in state compliance were obvious even to OSM. In state after
state, year after year the problems have been the same. For instance, many states
fail to make the required number of mine site inspections. State inspectors are conducting incomplete and inadequate inspections. State inspectors fail to cite all observed violations as required (Kentucky for example only cites one in every fourteen
violations observed), and states continue to approve permit applications which are
environmentally deficient.
Under the state primacy concept, when such failures are noted by OSM, SMCRA
requires federal intervention either to have the state correct the problem or to impose direct federal enforcement. However, ultimate federal responsibility has been
a paper tiger under the Reagan Administration. These repeated and increasing state
failures are ignored. 5
Eventually the states' problems were so great that even OSM could not overlook
them. The breakdowns in the Tennessee and Oklahoma state programs, for example, were so pervasive and the state response so uncooperative that OSM had no
other choice, after trying to avoid any federal role, but to revoke their primacy
authority.' 6 This, however, was an exception to the rule. Tennessee and Oklahoma
are minor coal producing states where it is more politically acceptable for OSM
to assert itself.
Larger problems in major coal states continue to be ignored. In 1985, for example, Kentucky was experiencing regulatory breakdown and gross mining abuse
,"Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 101(g), 91 Stat.
447 (1977).
OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, ANNU.

EVALUATION REPORTS (1983-85) (for all states).

"

Id.

16

49 Fed. Reg. 15,496 (1984); 49 Fed. Reg. 14,674 (1984).
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of pre-Act severity. Breakdowns in the Kentucky program continue to abound."7
Thousands of mine operators have illegally claimed to be exempt from the regulation and reclamation requirements of SMCRA by facetiously claiming a two-acre
or coal exploration exemption. State inspectors seldom cite any observed violations. Bonds are released despite the lack of complete reclamation. All of these
problems and the incredible on-the-ground environmental degradation are well
documented, but OSM has done little to assert its SMCRA responsibilities. OSM
officials unofficially admit that they do not have the political power to revoke
primacy from such a powerful coal state. If primacy were revoked, OSM's weakened
management ability and reduced funding would prevent it from undertaking direct
federal control.
In response to OSM's unwillingness and inability to exercise its regulatory
responsibilities, Congress is presently working to correct these major state primacy
breakdowns by forcing OSM to withhold abandoned mine land funds from states
with chronic failures.'
This, however, is not the way Congress intended state primacy to operate. When
the threat of ultimate federal authority is removed or even reduced, state primacy
is no longer an effective tool. Without the clout of federal enforcement, states are
vulnerable to the very same anti-regulatory pressures and influences which produced the serious damage to the environment that led to SMCRA's passage.
Another aspect of state primacy is the responsibility of mine plan review. A
key SMCRA goal is preventing environmental degradation before it occurs. One
way in which Congress envisioned this being accomplished was through the assembly
of a professional regulatory organization to assure the adequate review of mining
permit applications. A sound mining permit adequately addresses the manner in
which the operator will comply with performance standards, thereby aiding in the
prevention of environmental degradation. A deficient permit, on the other hand,
increases the potential for abuse. In the past, the states have generally not had
adequate resources, the technical expertise, and at times, the institutional fortitude
to ensure proper mine plan review. Historically, the states' shortcomings were often
overcome through OSM's technical assistance. Secretary Watt, however, sought
to cut OSM's technical services budget during his tenure.' 9 While OSM's technical
services budget has been restored by Congress, its technical assistance and oversight capabilities remain limited due to the agency's reorganization. As a result,
some states are regularly approving deficient permits which have and will cause
environmental degradation.

'7

OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, ANNUAL EVALUATION REPORT, KENTUCKY PERMANENT PROGRAM

(1984-85) (two reports).
" See H.R. REP. No. 3011, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12039 (1985).
19 DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR FISCAL YEAR

1981-83 (three

documents).
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IV.

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

SMCRA is unprecedented in providing the public with a panoply of rights to
participate in the regulatory decision making process for coal mining. Citizens are
entitled to participate in every aspect of mining regulation from permit application
to bond release. The power of the affected public to file a citizens' complaint,
in court if necessary, with the right to recover costs and attorney fees, is critical
to the enforcement of the Act.
Congress recognized that surface coal mining caused severe hardships for
coalfield citizens and therefore guaranteed the public an opportunity to play a major role in regulating that mining.20 It was Congress' intent that public concerns
be taken into account by state and federal decisionmakers in the establishment and
implementation of regulatory programs and policies. In practice, however, regulatory
authorities (both the states and OSM) often give SMCRA public participation only
superficial lip service. The public may be grudgingly afforded the right to file comments and make presentations at public hearings and meetings on rules and permit
applications, but in reality their articulated concerns are given short shrift by the
regulatory agencies when making the final decisions.
This hypocritical practice became most apparent when Secretary Watt rewrote
the federal regulations in 1981. While we were afforded the opportunity to file
comments and meet with officials, our substantive concerns were completely ignored. We then had no option other than to turn to the courts for relief."1 As
previously discussed, the court ruled overwhelmingly in our favor. However, this
process was extremely costly to the citizen groups, and even more so to the Department of Interior. All of this could have been limited or avoided altogether if government had allowed public concerns to play a genuine role in rulemaking as Congress
intended.
The same pattern is repeated all too frequently in the coalfields on mine-specific
issues, from reviewing permit applications to releasing bonds, and from filing unsuitability petitions to state program amendments. A strong frustration is now arising within the public interest community because OSM and the states are ignoring
citizens' valid, documented concerns. Therefore, SMCRA's public participation provisions are now perceived by citizens not as an avenue for influencing regulatory
policy but solely as a prerequisite for future litigation.
The intent of SMCRA's public participation provisions was to do more than
just establish required filing and meeting procedures. Public participation provisions are intended to ensure that public concerns are reflected in regulatory decisions,

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 102(i), 91 Stat.
448 (1977).
2: In re Surface Mining II, supra note 3.
20
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Not all public concerns are always ignored by the regulatory authorities. There
have certainly been some notable examples to the contrary. For instance, Pennsylvania is to be applauded for its very broad public participation approach to unsuitability petitions. 21 Pennsylvania has consistently been open and helpful to citizens
interested in filing unsuitability petitions, traditionally a very complex and controversial issue. By providing the public with advice, resources, data, and a spirit
of cooperation, Pennsylvania's implementation of section 522 of SMCRA is a model
of citizen participation as Congress intended.
V.

PERFORMANCE STANDARDS

The issue of performance standards must be discussed in its broadest definition as these standards are set forth in section 515 of SMCRA. This essay is not
intended to revisit the controversy over distinguishing performance standards from
design criteria. That debate would require much more space than this essay's limitations permit, and in any event, it has largely been a red herring for creating additional chaos and uncertainty about how mine operators must comply with the Act.
Furthermore, this issue has already been discussed in other publications.2"
SMCRA's performance standards are the centerpiece for achieving uniform
nationwide improvements in mining methods and environmental protection. Hereto,
the Act is unprecedented in the amount of regulatory specificity that Congress included in the statute itself. One of the reasons that states' regulatory programs
were largely ineffective prior to SMCRA was their vagueness, lack of objectivity,
and the unenforceability of their permitting and performance standards. As Congress recognized during its prolonged debate, the coal industry generally complies
with only the lowest common denominator in regulatory restrictions. Performance
standards which allow for broad operator interpretation usually lead to the least
expensive mining method, which can produce massive environmental degradation
and impose external costs on coalfield communities while generating higher profits
for industry. Because the coal industry is a very competitive business, other mine
operators are continually seeking the least expensive methods of mining and reclamation. In the 1960s and 70s, it was unworkable to give coal operators broad regulatory
platitudes and vague goals to achieve without requiring the specific manner to meet
them. It was unworkable to simply require that blasting practices not threaten the
safety of nearby residents. It was not enough to require only that water runoff
at a mine site not degrade the environment. It was not enough to require that sites
be regraded and revegetated with plant growth. Prior to 1977 when some state
regulatory laws required only such broad platitudes, the on-the-ground results of
reclamation were limited at best. Instead, degradation increased, and more often
than not, the states encountered total failure in meeting their stated goals.
22 PENNSYLVANIA

BUREAU OF MINING AND RECLAMATION, DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES,

PETITION PACKAGE FOR DESIGNATING AREAS UNSUITABLE FOR MINING, Doc. No. ER-MR-88 (June 1982).
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Because SMCRA established such specific performance standards and required
mine operators to follow specific mining and reclamation practices, the face of
surface mining reclamation has radically changed in this country. SMCRA's performance standards have dramatically reduced the widespread environmental abuse
that plagued the coalfields for decades. Through the use of sedimentation ponds
and erosion controls, water quality has substantially improved. Safety hazards from
irresponsible blasting practices have been greatly diminished by SMCRA's specific
requirements for handling explosives. Compliance with the performance standards
for topsoil preservation, regrading practices, revegetation techniques, and hydrology
has successfully restored many mine sites into productive lands once again.
Despite these improvements, compliance with the performance standards has
been a qualified success. As already discussed, haphazard levels of enforcement
by state regulatory agencies has significantly reduced the potential effectiveness of
SMCRA. No matter how detailed they are, performance standards will not produce improved mining and reclamation if they are not adequately enforced. Just
as operators usually seek the lowest common denominator in mining practices, so
too they seek the least possible regulatory compliance. If a state or OSM does not
regularly take enforcement action against operators who fail or refuse to meet performance standards, other operators are encouraged by competition to ignore the
standards as well.
This situation arose when the Texas Railroad Commission failed to enforce
performance standards regulating topsoil substitution and proper disposal of acidforming material. " This failure to enforce produced a wholesale breakdown in compliance by Texas coal mine operators and produced thousands of acres of topsoil
that are now illegally contaminated by acid-forming material.
SMCRA's basic performance standards do have a legitimate flexibility that
allows for the development of new and more efficient mining and regulatory techniques. Undoubtedly some could be revised to reflect the latest technology and experience. Discussion of potential changes in performance standards should not be
construed solely as an effort to bring more flexibility to the standards. There is
a legitimate need for less flexibility in some standards such as final cut lakes, valley
fills, and coal waste dams, due to demonstrated abuse. Nevertheless, soon after
SMCRA's passage it was anticipated that the regulations, and even SMCRA itself,
would probably need to be fine-tuned after a few years of experience. However,
as previously discussed, fine-tuning was not Secretary Watt's intent in 1981. Instead, he launched a wholesale assault on SMCRA, and support for reasonable
regulatory adjustment has been lost due to heightened suspicions by citizens. Even
some of SMCRA's harshest congressional critics in 1985 are no longer willing to
23

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, PERFORMANCE VS. DESIGN STANDARDS,
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consider amending the Act in the foreseeable future.2" Moreover, the environmental/citizen community, in light of recent history, is distrustful and wary of suggestions from industry, the states, or OSM, of any need to fine-tune SMCRA at the
present time.

VI.

OSM's

FUTURE

Because OSM is currently so plagued with management, resource, and morale
problems, the House Government Operations Committee has raised an important
question regarding OSM's ability to correct the situation. The House Committee
warned that unless OSM made significant progress within six-to-nine months in
meeting its mandated responsibilities, the committee would recommend to Congress that OSM be moved out of the Department of Interior's jurisdiction.2 The
legislative history of SMCRA debated the alternatives of placing OSM in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the Department of Interior back in 1975.27
Members of Congress voiced concern over the Department of Interior's dismal
regulatory history and capabilities. Congressman Udall acknowledged the Department's failures, but he assured Congress that OSM could be adequately insulated
from the coal development factions within the Department. As previously discussed, such insulation was achieved in part by Secretary Andrus but promptly eliminated
by Secretary Watt.
We agree with the concern of the House Government Operations Committee
that OSM's enforcement and state oversight must improve. Continued OSM failures
cannot be permitted to undermine the very real effectiveness of SMCRA. If improvement does not occur, however, careful consideration must be given to the
appropriateness of moving OSM to another federal agency. Removing OSM from
Interior will not resolve OSM's problems. In fact, there is a risk that such an action will act as an illusion of improvement when in essence little is changed. There
is also a danger that OSM's confusion, instability, high staff turnover, and management problems would simply be exacerbated by such a move. Moving and/or
establishing a new federal agency is no simple matter. It would require an amendment of SMCRA and would certainly mean yet another protracted period of uncertainty for the regulatory program. However, if the Department of Interior continues to fail in its mission to enforce SMCRA, OSM's removal is likely to occur.
Central to this debate is the question of whether to move OSM to EPA, or to
make it an independent administrative agency. In our opinion, moving OSM to
EPA would do little to solve OSM's problems and would likely create new ones.
EPA's environmental regulatory programs have been subjected to repeated assaults
by the Reagan Administration, and that agency's effectiveness has been frequently
unstabilized, just as OSM's has been undermined.

1, Lewis, OSM: A Controversial Past, An Uncertain Future, 8 LANDMARC MAGAZINE 12, 16
(Sept./Oct. 1985).
26 H.R. REP. No. 206, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1985).
17 121 CONG. REc. 6704 (1975); S. REP. No. 402, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1973).
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Establishing OSM as an independent administrative authority, however, does
merit consideration. The desirability of this option greatly depends upon the structure of the commission, its independence, its method of selecting leadership, and
other factors. In order for the environmental/citizen community to support even
the concept of OSM as an independent regulatory commission, there must be firm
assurances that it will be truly insulated and independent from the political and
economic pressures of the local industry and state governments which it is charged
with regulating. Unless such assurances are written into the law transforming OSM,
we cannot lend any support to the idea.
In sum, we see no merit in moving OSM within the Executive Branch or changing OSM to an independent regulatory agency unless those amendments include
strong safeguards and explicit, enforceable standards that will address and abate
OSM's past problems with primacy, oversight, enforcement, adequate resources,
and public participation.
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